Men allegedly involved in a wave of attacks across Iraq are displayed
for the media at federal police headquarters in Baghdad, Apr. 14. With
the assassinations, bombings and religious strife apparently growing
worse by the day, the wisdom of America’s withdrawal and even the
invasion itself are again being called into question.
The 'Calamitous'
Results of America’s Iraq Withdrawal (Le Monde,
France)
“Their arrival was a catastrophe,
and their departure is already a calamity. ... The original sin of America’s Iraq
Proconsul Paul Bremer was to set up the interim Iraqi Governing Council largely
along religious and ethnic lines. Democracy, as touted by the neoconservatives
close to George W. Bush, has become more of an instrument of domination than liberation.”
Iraq Vice President Tariq Al-Hashimi: hiding in autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan, Al-Heshemi is charged with running a hit squad and planning the assassination of Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki.
Their
arrival was a catastrophe, and their departure is already a calamity. Even if the
full impact of the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 remains far from clear, it
is evident that it destabilized the entire Middle East. But we have yet to fully
understand the extent to which last December’s departure of American forces
from this fragile and still unstable country has had, and will continue to have,
devastating effects. Not that the withdrawal wasn’t desirable – the occupation
had become unbearable for the majority of Iraqis – but because it took place
without a stable political and institutional framework having been established.
Moreover, the
withdrawal took place at a time of tremendous regional instability as a result
of the Syrian crisis and the tug-of war-over Iran’s nuclear program. These two sources
of tension highlight the regional split between Shiites and Sunnis, which has
been building for nearly a decade. But Iraq is the weakest link in the Middle
East. The most significant consequence of the American withdrawal has been to
leave Shiites and Sunnis face to face, just as the hostility between the two
communities has reached a climax.
The notion
that the end of the U.S. occupation of Iraq would enable the country to return
to some kind of normality has long prevailed. But such thinking ignored the
extent to which the U.S. occupation dismantled the structure and regional
environment of Iraq. There is no going back to the old order: it has
disappeared.
Iraq’s
current tragedy is a result of the fact that the United States, tired of a costly
and embarrassing war, withdrew before having stabilized the structures put in
place after the fall of Saddam Hussein. Besides dismantling the Iraqi army and
Baath Party, the original sin of America’s Iraq proconsul from 2003 to 2005,
Paul Bremer, was to set up the interim Iraqi Governing Council largely along
religious and ethnic lines. Keen to ensure “balanced” representation, Mr. Bremer
assembled a judicious mix of Shiites, Sunnis, Kurds and Christians. In line
with the country’s demographics, he gave a majority to the Shiites, who had been
long oppressed under Saddam Hussein and his predecessors – who were all Sunnis.
And so the seeds of conflict were sown.
This unique
arrangement served only to spark a fierce competition between Shiites and
Sunnis, which degenerated into civil war starting in 2006. When the first free
elections took place in 2005, a boycott of the election by Sunni parties and a
balloting process – proportional representation in the context of a single national
list – reinforced Shiite domination.
Attempts to
correct the initial error were fruitless, but the Americans, by virtue of their
influence and presence, played a moderating role, especially after the last
legislative elections in 2010. It was at their insistence that (Shiite) Prime Minister
Nouri
Al-Malikiformed a national unity government that included the
main Sunni coalition, the al-Iraqiya bloc.
The U.S. Army
had scarcely departed, at night and almost shamefacedly on December 21, 2011,
when the prime minister issued an arrest warrant for the (Sunni) Vice President
Tarik
al-Hashimi on charges of masterminding assassinations
and attacks, and initiated impeachment proceedings against the (Sunni) Deputy Prime
Minister Saleh al-Mutlaq. These two coups
immediately set off a wave of deadly bombings targeting Shiite neighbourhoods. Tarik Al-Hashemi fled Iraq for
Qatar, then Saudi Arabia, the two regional ‘godfathers’ of Sunni Islam. From
his current location in Riyadh, al-Mutlaq denounces
Iran’s takeover of Iraq through its Shiite allies and thanks to America’s
withdrawal – which has left a vacuum.
This is just
one of the many American inconsistencies: while engaged in a fierce nuclear standoff,
Washington has given free rein to Iranian influence in Iraq. Washington’s
leading intermediary, Prime Minister al-Maliki,
defines himself as “Shiite, Iraqi, Arab and a member of the al-Dawa Party (a Shiite Islamist party)”: the word order here
is critical. Al-Maliki now wields significant power, having
consolidated the roles of head of state, defense minister and interior minister.
In
addition, he has divided and intimidated his opponents. As a Shiite, Maliki gains maximum advantage within an institutional structure
where a majority of positions of power are allotted along sectarian lines, but without
this being determined by hard and fast principles, as is the case in Lebanon, which
is another multi-faith Arab state. Democracy, as touted by the neoconservatives
close to George W. Bush, has become more of an instrument of domination than liberation.
Inspired by
the success of the Kurdish province, which enjoys quasi-independence, the Sunni
provinces are also demanding a high degree of autonomy. This temptation is reinforced
by the centrifugal prospect that a Sunni majority could come to power in
neighbouring Syria after four decades of rule by the Alawites,
a dissident branch of Shiite Islam. The Shiite majority now in power in Iraq is
hostile to this desire for emancipation on the part of Sunnis, fearing a loss
of oil reserves and the disintegration of the country.
Iraq, although
at the centerof
this regional imbroglio, is not the only country affected by this sectarian
fault line. All the ingredients for a Shiite-Sunni confrontation are also
present in Syria, Lebanon, Bahrain and Yemen, with the respective champions
being Iran and Saudi Arabia. Iran’s nuclear ambitions and the struggle for
regional hegemony between Riyadh and Tehran give this confrontation tragic
potential.
